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DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE REMARKS OF MR. MCRAE
AND MR. COLSON
MR. MclLROY: We are ready for questions. And the first one I see is
Dr. King's hand up.
PROFESSOR KING: Yeah, I had a question. I'm a poor, self-respecting
salmon, and I want to spawn, that's a natural desire. What I'm concerned
about is the enforcement of these rights of the salmon in the spawning
grounds, and the enforcement of this whole thing. I mean, how do we do it?
How do we -- Don, you talked about a lot of complex agreements. And Jim
wisely said that one concern here was the fisher, the fish. You want to pre-
serve the fish; to survive, the fish have to spawn.
What about the enforcement of the fish's rights to spawn? How does that
happen? I mean is there something I don't know about? Or, if maybe you
could enlighten us on it. It's a question of survival.
MR. McRAE: In very formal legal terms, the fishery is controlled in
Canada by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. And its first objective is
to put fish on the spawning ground, what is referred to as escapement. Its
second objective is to provide a food fishery for First Nations. And then its
other objectives relate to commercial and recreational fishery.
So it manages the fishery by opening for the commercial fishery when it
is assured that enough fish have passed through to get up to the spawning
ground.
Now, that raises some really difficult questions. How do tell if enough
fish have escaped to the spawning grounds? They have counting mecha-
nisms in the rivers to determine how many fish have reached a certain point.
They have assessments on the ground to make sure that enough salmon actu-
ally got to the spawning ground.
But when you get to endangered species and the Species at Risk Act,
there are more difficult questions. Currently, in British Columbia, there has
been a request for an emergency listing under the Species at Risk Act of two
stocks of salmon, one going to Cultus Lake and one going to Saginaw Lake.
But, should every separate stock and every single stream in British Columbia
be protected. Or, do we say we're protecting enough salmon overall in the
Fraser River that we don't have to protect the particular stock in Cultus Lake.
Some fishers might say you are making a choice between our economic live-
lihood and protecting the Cultus Lake salmon. But what about the cottages
around Cultus Lake pollution from which might have inhibited the salmon
from spawning? They are paying nothing for the decline in the stocks; it is
the commercial fishery that is paying.
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Thus, getting salmon to the spawning ground is a complicated question of
reconciling and balancing interests. Overall, there is a reasonably effective
method to make sure salmon are able to spawn. But of course, the most ef-
fective method is you just don't let people fish.
MR. MclLROY: We have another question up there in the corner.
MR. KERESTER: Has the delegation of authority by Congress to the
Regional Council ever been challenged as an improper delegation of legisla-
tive authority? And, two, in the case of the 200-mile limit, is there some
international agreement recognizing the 200-mile limit, or does it depend on
the strength of your Navy?
MR. COLSON: On the latter question, I think that international state
practice has evolved to the point that all countries in the world have 200-mile
limits that are capable of having 200-mile limits; this is a centerpiece of the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention that virtually all countries are party to, in-
cluding Canada. The United States is still considering that. But I think that
there's no question about the legality of the 200-mile limit.
The first question --
PROFESSOR KING: You didn't discuss the Customary International
Law. It's Customary International Law.
MR. COLSON: All right. I agree, but the arbitrator who says it's cus-
tomary international law remains to be determined.
But on the first question, no, and I don't think anybody has ever chal-
lenged the law on that basis -- it is putting in the hands of a regional grouping
the power to make a particular kind of decision. I don't think anybody's ever
even assumed that there was a Constitutional problem with that delegation.
PROFESSOR KING: Could I ask another question?
MR. MclLROY: Dr. King has -- this gentleman here has a mike in his
hand, so we'll let him go first, and then Dr. King next, please.
MR. JENSEN: Erik Jensen, Case School of Law. I am intrigued by the
idea that the Canadian government is still in the process of entering into trea-
ties with First Nations, I mean, something that hasn't happened in the United
States since 1871.
Can the panelists please discuss the reason for the different legal statuses
of First Nations in the two countries?
MR. McRAE: I'm not sure that I can answer that question, because I'm
really not an authority on aboriginal or constitutional law.
Nigel Bankes, do you know why they didn't conclude treaties in British
Columbia?
MR. BANKES: Well, I think we stopped negotiating treaties in about
1924, was our last formal treaty negotiation. And then we started a new
round with the northern First Nations in the mid 1970s with Quebec, know-
ing -- Quebec being first, and then throughout the territories and through into
British Columbia.
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But, of course, there is an analogy with the United States, because the last
treaty in the United States was probably the Native Claims Settlement in
Alaska in the early 1970s, which was, if you'd like, almost a prelude to the
new round of treaty negotiations in Canada, I mean, that whole land claim
settlement negotiations, but they're treaty negotiations.
MR. JENSEN: They're not treaties for purposes of United States law, I
don't think, in the United States.
MR. COLSON: Well, our treaties, the U.S. treaties with the tribes that
were entered into as treaties, are treaties of the United States. And there is a
body of law that surrounds that. If you go to the old executive office build-
ing, there is the treaty room. And it is because it was the room that all of the
chiefs would come to Washington in the 19th Century and sign treaties with
the President. It's a beautiful room.
MR. JENSEN: But that doesn't happen anymore.
MR. COLSON: No, because now it is a question of what do those treaties
mean. And that is a source of constant litigation in the Federal Courts, and
debate and negotiation with Federal bureaucracies and tribal bureaucracies,
but I don't think -- I've never heard of a situation where someone was pro-
moting that the way to resolve a new problem was to renegotiate or negotiate
a new treaty between the Federal Government and one of the native tribes.
MR. McILROY: Dr. King, and then Michael Robinson.
PROFESSOR KING: Yeah. I had a question, two aspects: first, does the
reluctance of the Senate to ratify treaties in the fisheries area, is that a handi-
cap? And, secondly, what effect does the Law of the Sea Convention, if, by
any chance, we ever ratify it, affect -- what effect does that have on this
whole fisheries question? I'd address it to Dave Colson.
MR. COLSON: Well, first, on the -- your latter question, I don't think it
has any effect, really. I mean, it's sort of a non-issue, in my mind.
On the former question, somebody asked the question yesterday about
what would the two Senators from North Dakota think about doing some
kind of a deal affecting their state's interest. I think there's a tradition in the
United States that when a treaty affects a particular region, that the Senators
from that region better be onboard if the Senate is to act positively.
And let's say the two North Dakota Senators are adamantly opposed, but
the President and the Secretary of State are up before the Senate talking
about the U.S. national interests or something, and we ought to do this, deal
with Canada about North Dakota. It just doesn't happen that way. That's
not the way the United States Senate has traditionally worked, and it's not
likely to work.
So when we have a fisheries issue, if we get solid regional political sup-
port, like in the Pacific Salmon negotiations, in the Pacific Salmon Treaty, at
that time we had the political support of the Senators from the concerned
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states. And when that happens, such treaties get through like, you know,
without any difficulty.
I will note that at the end of 1970s, when the United States and Canada
were trying to come to grips with all of the fish problems that were created
by the 200-mile zone, we submitted to the Senate the big East Coast Fish
Treaty with Canada. That was justified to the Senate in terms of broad na-
tional interests. It was something that both the Secretary of State and the
President were very much supportive of. And there wasn't one New England
Senator that would support the Treaty. It was dead in the water.
And no matter -- so, I mean, that's just the way American politics work in
the Senate. So if you've got the support, you'll get it done on these agree-
ments that are regionally focused.
MR. MclLROY: Michael Robinson, you had a question, I believe.
MR. ROBINSON: Thanks, Jim. It was more of a follow-up on the ques-
tion about why we're only negotiating treaties in B.C. with the native bands
now. I am certainly no expert on native treaty law, but I had always under-
stood that the popular understanding is it wasn't necessary; nobody wanted to
go into northern B.C. and "occupy" it.
At that time, the population of B.C. was confined to sort of Vancouver
and Victoria. And they had very strange governments out there. Some of
you will be interested to know that the first Governor of British Columbia
was named Amor DeCosmos, honest to God name.
MR. de BOER: Hey, that's my cousin.
MR. ROBINSON: He changed it legally to Amor DeCosmos. So they
just didn't give a darn about the natives. As long as they didn't get in their
way, nobody felt they had to sign a treaty with them. Very foolish of them.
Now, they have to do it now.
MR. MclLROY: We also had a B.C. Premier that was formerly known as
Wacky Bennett, but I won't get into that.
I'd like to just make a comment in that the -- there was a comment made
just a moment ago in one of the questions that, yes, we have treaties with
natives, but are they treaties with the government of the United States. And I
think David answered that.
But the idea of a treaty in my mind is something between a national gov-
ernment and another national government. And underpinning that is the idea
it's between the executive of the national government and the executive of
the national government.
And, as you know, Prime Minister Martin and President Bush are going to
be meeting later on this month. And the idea is that when two executives get
together, they can actually do something. I'm not so sure given what we've
been hearing today and yesterday.
I mean, more and more what we're hearing is, even at the national level,
you have -- in the executive branch, you have Federal Departments with very
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conflicting agendas that are all fighting with each other. I believe Ambassa-
dor Giffin referred to that as stovepiping.
The other thing you have is you have the dynamic -- the executive cannot
just decide, you also have the Congress, you have the legislature, which is a
far more difficult dynamic in the United States, I think, than it is in Canada
with our parliamentary system.
And then on top of this Federal executive and legislative fighting, we
have Federalism, where you have many states and provinces involved. And
you heard -- I found it fascinating, Don's divide and conquer strategy, and
let's deal with Alaska, and then we'll deal with the guys in the south. But
Americans seem to be doing that with Canada on soft wood lumber.
I guess the point that I'm saying is that in addition to the Federal and Pro-
vincial Government and all of the executive, legislative fighting going on
within there, you now have a more recent layer, which is non-governmental
organizations. I mean, it was complicated enough when you just had gov-
ernments involved.
And I guess my question to the speakers is that our conference is multiple
actors in Canada-U.S. relations. I think that your presentation has just told us
how multiple it is. I mean, even when you talk about fishers, there's indus-
trial fishers and boutique fishers.
Are governments becoming bit players in Canada-U.S. relations? And if
their power is spread out and diluted as much as it is, they seem to be more
mediators than executive decision-makers.
And I guess my real question is, is this a recipe for an action and for the
status quo, because you just -- power is so spread out, you're just never going
to be able to get a big bang kind of a decision. It's always going to be a very
compromised mediated type of decision.
MR. COLSON: I was listening yesterday in the afternoon session about
what might be the right thing to do on some of these border crossing issues.
And while I have no background in that body of legal relationships, I could
see the complexity involved in just trying to put a deal together both on --
just on one side of the border, but then trying to bring both sides of the bor-
der together.
And then we heard about the Columbia River Treaty. And the Columbia
River Treaty was negotiated what, 40 years ago. It was clearly a treaty that
had a very substantial vision and technical backing to it, but it was not a
treaty that today could have been negotiated with 2,500 stakeholders.
It had to -- I don't know anything about its background, but it had to be a
treaty that a only a few people on both sides of the border where involved
with, said, yes, this is the right thing to do. They went out, they put it to-
gether, they got some political support, and they got it through the Senate on
the U.S. side.
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I don't think there's any way in God's green earth you can do a treaty like
the Columbia River Treaty today in the United States. It just -- it's too big.
It's too visionary. It has too many interests now involved. And it would take
an enormous amount of energy to try to make that happen.
So, yes, I think in part we have, at least on our side, on the issues that I'm
familiar with, it is really hard to move off the status quo. And the only way
you can do it, if one of two things happens.
One, all of a sudden, the Federal Government is prepared to throw a
bunch of money at people in order to get them to come to some reasonable
point of view. And that happens in some of these cases. And that's the way
you bring people together sometimes, you say, look, if all you guys be rea-
sonable, and we work out this deal with Canada, the Federal Government
will throw a bunch of money at the problem, and we'll take care of this in
some way. And it will be this win-win thing that people were talking about
yesterday.
And, then, the other way that the status quo is overcome is when there's
total disaster out there. And when there isn't another fish in the ocean, then
it's a lot easier to negotiate about fish than when there's something to fight
about.
MR. McILROY: On that happy note, we'll pass it over to Don.
MR. McRAE: Throwing money at it was part of the Pacific Salmon solu-
tion. The U.S. Government established an endowment fund. And that made
the Alaskans happy. The U.S. Government also gave money for the buyout
for the State of Washington. So money was a critical part of it.
But I also think that the reality is changing. The idea that the Prime Min-
ister and cabinet will run roughshod and enter into treaties at will no longer
applies, if it ever did. Domestic interests have to be reconciled. Similarly,
two governments can't sit down and say we know the national interests and
we can negotiate agreements without the involvement of stakeholders is also
gone.
And what it comes down to also is what we mean by national interests. In
negotiating the Pacific Salmon agreements, the governments were really the
agents for the various people on both side of the border who are interested in
the salmon, who derive a livelihood from it, or who benefit from the eco-
nomic and the environmental or cultural value of the salmon.
Now, you can call that the national interest, or you can call it local sec-
tional interests, but those are the interests that have to be reconciled. And it
only makes sense that those interests have to be taken into account. What we
need to find are negotiating mechanisms and techniques that will involve
those interests much more.
This is happening in other areas, too. If you look at the negotiation of the
Land Mines Convention or the International Criminal Court, governments sat
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down with NGO's. Those NGO's were involved in the negotiations because
reflecting the interests that the governments were promoting.
So international negotiations are becoming messier, but it is getting messy
everywhere, not just in this area.
Now, you can call that the national interest, or you can call it local sec-
tional interests, but those are the interests that have to be reconciled. And it
only makes sense that those interests have to be taken into account. What
we're finding is systems that are involving those interests much, much more.
This is not the only area. If you look at the negotiation of the Land Mines
Convention, the International Criminal Court, governments sat down with
NGO's. NGO's were involved in those negotiations because those are the
people who were pushing the interests that the governments were reflecting.
So I think it's messy, and it's getting messy everywhere, not just in this
area.
MR. McILROY: I'm going to wrap it up, but I guess from my perspec-
tive, I see what we've been discussing over the last few days is a recipe for
very incremental changes, not big bang visionary changes in the relationship.
But I'd like to thank our speakers. As I said, there is more to this than
meets the eye. I think they've really given us a case study of how -- particu-
larly, David's historical perspective, as how they did deals in the past, and
now how they do deals now. And just seeing how all of these new interests
have become involved in this process and made it, as Don said, a rather
messy process. But democracy is messy.
Thank you very much.
(Session Concluded)
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